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THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

## 1. Why do we take up the problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare?

Regular warfare was the main part and guerrilla warfare the supplementary part in the anti-Japanese war. Since we have understood this part correctly, there should only be problems of tactics in guerrilla warfare. Then why do we take up the problem of strategy?

If we were a small country, naturally there would only be problems of tactics instead of problems of strategy, because guerrilla warfare would, in that case, give only some direct and short-distance coordination effects in campaigns and battles of the regular army. If we were as strong as the USSR, then, naturally, there would be problems of tactics only, because the enemy would be driven out quickly after the invasion, or even if the enemy occupation lasted relatively long, still the occupied area would not be vast, and consequently guerrilla warfare could only play a kind of coordinating role in the fighting.

It was under the following circumstances that the problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare arose: China is neither a small nation nor a USSR; China is large but a weak country. This large but weak nation was being invaded by a small but strong country; however, that nation is a very progressive country. All problems originated from there. It was under these circumstances that the Japan was able to occupy vast territories of our country and conducted a war of long duration. Although the enemy occupied vast territories of our country, her force was not sufficient, since Japan is a small nation.

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She left many places unoccupied. Thus, anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare did not involve close coordination with the regular army operations. It was involved in independent guerrilla warfare away from the main battle (of the Regular Army). In addition, due to the progress made in China, these operations were waged on a large scale. Therefore, problems in strategic defense and strategic offense came up. Due to the long and lasting nature of the war (accompanied abominable cruelty), something unusual must be done in carrying out the guerrilla warfare with reference to the choosing of bases and the developing of mobile warfare. Accordingly, the Chinese anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare could not be considered from the tactical viewpoint only. Strategy was a major consideration. It is to be noted that such a large scale and lasting guerrilla warfare is a rather new experience in the military history of the world. It came in the progressive era of 1930's and 1940's. This is the focal point of the problem. Our enemy is dreaming probably the same dreams as Yuan Dynasty's Conquest of Sung, Ch'ing Dynasty's victory over Ming, British occupation of the North America and East Indies and the Latin's domination of the Central and South America. Dreams such as these can never be realized in present-day China, because she adds something new to her possession. One of these new things is the guerrilla warfare. If our enemy does not calculate such a factor, she will be doomed to failure.

This is the reason that the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare should be considered from a strategic point of view, although it is only an auxiliary element in the whole war.

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3. The basic principle of the war: self-preservation and extermination of the enemy.

Before we go into the specific strategic problems in guerrilla warfare, we shall discuss the basic issues of war.

The guiding principle of any military action is based on one fundamental principle; that is, to preserve our own forces and exterminate that of the enemy. During the revolutionary war, this principle was directly related to the basic political issue. For example, the basic political purpose (the political aim) of the anti-Japanese war is to wipe out Japanese imperialism and to establish a free, independent and prosperous new China. To fulfill this militarily, we have to defend our fatherland and wipe out the Japanese thieves with force. It follows naturally that in military action, we must try our best to preserve our own forces as far as possible but to exterminate the enemies in a most efficient way. Then how do we explain why we encourage the spirit of sacrifice? Every war has its price. Sometimes the costs run very high. Does this not contradict the idea of "self-preservation?" Actually, there is no contradiction. Precisely speaking, self-preservation and sacrifice are quite consistent with one another; since sacrifice is not only necessary for wiping out of the enemy, but also necessary for self-preservation. In fact, temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice) is always for the permanent preservation of the whole. Based on this understanding, a series of principles of shooting (for example, to screen oneself and to intensify fire power, the former is to preserve oneself while the latter is to exterminate the enemy), to the strategic problem,

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the same spirit has been carried through. In short, all the technical, tactical, and strategic principles are but stipulation of this basic principle, namely to preserve oneself and to exterminate the enemy.

#### 4. Six practical strategic problems in the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.

Now let us discuss the military aspect of the guerrilla warfare. What course or principle should be taken to attain our aim of preserving ourselves and exterminating the enemies? Guerrilla columns in the anti-Japanese war (and in all revolutionary wars) develop as a rule from non-existence to existence, and from small units to large ones. We must expand ourselves in addition to self-preservation. Thus, the problem is: what course of action should be taken?

Generally speaking, there are the following main courses: (1) To launch, with initiative, actively and systematically, an offensive battle in a defensive battle, to engage in a quick decisive battle in a long drawn out battle, and to launch periphery operations away from the main lines; (2) To coordinate with regular warfare; (3) To establish bases; (4) To plan strategic defense and offense; (5) To develop mobile warfare; and (6) To organize correct relations of command. These six items are the entire strategic program of the anti-Japanese war and are the necessary steps to preserve and develop ourselves, to exterminate and wipe out the enemy, to coordinate with regular warfare, and to attain the final victory.

5. The first problem: To launch, with initiative, actively and systematically, an offensive battle in a defensive battle, to engage in a quick decisive battle in a long drawn out battle, and to launch periphery operations away from the main battle lines.

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We may divide this problem into four points: (1) Relations between defensive and offensive, endurance and decisive battles, periphery and main operations; (2) Initiative in operations; (3) Active employment of forces (aggressiveness) and (4) Thorough planning of all actions.

Let us explain the first point. In this anti-Japanese war, since the Japanese believes are strong and are able to launch offensive and we are weak and fighting a defensive war, it is clear that we are strategically in a defensive position. The enemy is now engaged in a war away from its home territory while we are fighting a war within our country. Although the enemy force is stronger (the quality of weapons and the number of personnel), quantitatively speaking, she is not strong. Quantitatively we are superior than the enemy although weak to some respect (quality of weapons and number of personnel). Furthermore, the enemy is an invader from an alien country. Our resistance is against a foreign power. All these factors require the adoption of the following strategic policies: To adopt an offensive campaign in the strategic defensive battle and to engage in a prompt decisive campaign in the strategic long drawn out fight; and to develop periphery operations while engaged in a limited main line operations. This is the strategy which should be carried out throughout the entire war. This applies to both regular warfare and guerrilla warfare. The only difference when applied to guerrilla warfare is a matter of degree and forms of application. In guerrilla warfare, offensive generally refer to raids characterized by swift attack. Raids should and can be used in regular warfare, but they would not surprise the enemy too much. In guerrilla warfare, it is very important to make prompt and swift attacks, but it is not too easy to encircle the enemy in periphery areas.

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It is necessary in guerrilla operations to concentrate as much manpower as possible to launch secret and swift attacks, to attack the enemy by surprise and to end the fighting promptly. It is also necessary to avoid passive defense and unnecessary delays, and to disperse the forces before fighting. There should not only be strategic defense in guerrilla warfare, but also tactical defense, such as deployment of force cautiously during engagements at strategic points, rivers or villages with a view to harass and exhaust the enemy, covering forces during the retreat, etc. These are the main aspects of tactical defense in guerrilla warfare. Basically, however, guerrilla warfare should be offensive. It should be more offensive than the regular army. The guerrilla attacks should be surprise attacks. Thus, it is less permissible to expose the operation than the regular army. The guerrilla battle may last several days; such as when attacking a small isolated enemy column etc. In general guerrilla combat requires more rapid and brief performance than the regular army combat due to the fact that the guerrilla units are generally weaker than the enemies. Furthermore, guerrilla combat should be wide spread and be carried out everywhere. Many guerrilla operations, such as harassing attacks, encirclement, destruction, and working on the masses, require wide dispersion of forces. Nevertheless, concentration rather than dispersion rules whenever the aim is to wipe out a whole enemy column. It is clear that "attacking small enemy column with a large and more concentrated force" still remains an important principle of guerrilla warfare.

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Through offensive successes of both guerrilla and regular forces, we can hope to win the defensive war and finally wipe out the Japanese imperialists. Furthermore, if we could win many prompt, swift, and offensive combats in the course of war, we can help to achieve our strategic aim, that is, to gain more time for improving our strength, to plan our strategy in accordance with improving changes in international situations, to pave the way for the collapse of the enemies themselves, and to launch finally an overall offensive to wipe out the enemies from our country. In strategic offensive or defensive, we should force the enemies to fight in the periphery areas to help us encircle and exterminate them. Encircle a part of them, if not the whole; annihilate a number of those encircled, if not all of them. By engaging the enemy in a war of attrition, we will be able to change the balance between us and our enemy and break through the enemy's encirclement strategy. Finally, by cooperating with the international forces and the Japanese revolutionary elements we will be able to encircle and overthrow the Japanese imperialists successfully. Of course, it is possible to defeat the enemy through regular warfare, and thus, guerrilla warfare may seem only of secondary importance; however, it must be borne in mind guerrilla warfare can contribute greatly to final victory through its many minor victories. This is the reason that guerrilla warfare is strategically important in the course of the war.

Now let us discuss the problems of initiative, activeness and planning in guerrilla warfare. What is initiative of guerrilla warfare?

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In the course of any battle, each side is always trying to take the initiative over the other, either on the combat field, battle front or even in battle areas, because initiative means freedom for the army. Once an army loses its initiative and is forced to be in a defensive position, it will not have freedom but will be in danger of being annihilated and defeated. Ordinarily, it is much more difficult to gain the initiative in a strategic defensive operations than in an offensive operations. However, there are two weaknesses in the Japanese plan: The lack of fighting manpower and the handicaps inherent in an offensive war against another nation. The Japanese have committed many errors in the execution of the war. They miscalculated the strength of the forces and lacked unified overall strategy as a result of contradictions among the Japanese military leaders. For examples, they increased their forces gradually without due consideration to general strategy, they did not pursue any specific policy, many times they lost the chances of victory by negligence, they successfully carried out encirclements but failed to annihilate our forces, etc. Due to these reasons, the Japanese military castles lost their initiative day after day, despite the fact that they were in a very advantageous position initially to gain the victory. At present, Japan does not and cannot end this war. Her strategic offensive has not been stopped as yet but its scope is being limited offensive. These weak points make it impossible for Japan to swallow up China. Some day Japan will be put in a complete passive position. This trend is already quite evident. China was fighting passive war during the first period. In the second period, due to experience, China adopted a new mobile operations, that is, the

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the offensive campaigns and battles, and the policy of engaging enemies in swift conclusive battles and periphery operations. In addition, guerrilla warfare was expanded throughout China. China is gaining initiative day by day.

The problem of initiative in guerrilla warfare is more serious, because guerrillas are engaged in more hazardous operations. This results from the fact that there is no rear support, the partisans lack sufficient experience (especially newly recruited guerrillas), and unification has not yet been accomplished. Nevertheless, the initiative can be gained through guerrilla warfare. The main thing is to take advantage of the aforementioned weak points of the enemy. Because the enemy lacks unified command, the guerrillas can operate very efficiently against them. The regular army and guerrillas in particular should take advantage of all enemy's weak points and inflict great casualties against them. On the other hand, guerrillas must correct their own weakness in the course of the struggle. Sometimes handicaps of our guerrillas have put them in a better position to gain initiative. As an example, it is only because guerrillas are weak and small that they are able to operate freely behind the enemy lines. The enemy does not know how to handle them. This freedom of action is hardly possible for regular armies.

It is extremely difficult for guerrillas to gain initiative when the enemy is encircling them from several directions. If the estimate of enemy's disposition was incorrect, in such case, it would prove very disastrous and would put them in a passive position. Moreover, it would be impossible to break through the enemy's encirclement.

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The same situation will happen when the enemy is in a defensive position and we are in the offensive. Therefore, the initiative is a product of the accurate estimate of your own and enemy's situations and the correct disposition of military and political personnel. Pessimistic estimate which is not in accord with the objective situation will undoubtedly lead to the loss of the initiative, and plunge the pessimists into a passive position. But similarly, over-optimistic estimate and the adventurous disposition (unnecessary adventure) which follows such estimation, may lead to loss of initiative and may bring the same fate that ultimately befalls the pessimists. The initiative is not the sole property of any genius but is the product of clear objective study, accurate evaluation of the objective situation, and correct implementation of military and political actions by competent leaders. In short, it is something for which one should plan thoroughly; it is not a ready-made thing.

When forced into a passive position by inaccurate estimate, unsound disposition or by unavoidable causes, efforts must be made to escape from such passiveness. How escape can be effected depends on the situation. In many cases, it is necessary "to run away". "To go away" is the characteristic of guerrillas. "To run away" means to discard passiveness and to regain initiative. When the enemy is victorious and we are facing difficulty, they may become overconfident. In such case, it would be possible for us to take advantage of the situation and launch a surprise attack to regain the initiative.

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Let us examine aggressiveness. Aggressiveness is a concrete expression of initiative. It is more necessary to employ forces actively in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

Leaders in guerrilla warfare should know that the active employment of forces is the most important means to change the balance of power between the enemy and us and to gain the initiative. Because of the peculiarities of guerrilla warfare, the employment of forces should be based mainly on the mission, enemy situation, geographical features and local population. Main methods are the dispersion, concentration and the shifting of fighting strength. Leaders of guerrillas, as fishermen catching fish in nets, should know how to cast and draw back in the maneuvering of guerrillas. When casting a net, it is necessary to see the depth of fresh water, the speed of the current and whether there is any obstacle or not. The same is true in guerrilla warfare. It is necessary to be cautious so as not to suffer losses from obscure situations and wrong actions. Just as it is necessary to seize the main strings of a net to pull it back, it is necessary to maintain communication liaison and retain part of the main force on hand in the disposition of troops. As it is necessary to change places often in fishing, it is necessary to change positions of the troops in guerrilla warfare. Dispersion, concentration and shifting are the three means for the active employment of forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, guerrilla units are usually disbanded or "dispersed into small groups" under the following circumstances: (1) when the enemy is firmly entrenched in a defensive position and there is no possibility of engaging them in a battle by concentrating our force and decision is made to carry out harassing operations against

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the enemy along the front line; (2) when decision is made to launch a general disturbance and demolition actions against weak enemy areas; (3) when there is no possibility of breaking through the enemy encirclement to minimize exposition of our troops to permit safe escape; (4) when limited by geographical features and supplies; and (5) when engaged in popular movements in vast areas. Regardless of the circumstances, when units are dispersed or dispersed, special considerations must be given: (1) to maintain a relatively large force in areas which are suitable for mobile action instead of dispersing the units equally so that when the opportunity presents itself, effective concerted actions can be taken against the enemy; and (2) to inform every dispersed group, its area of operations, time for action, place of assembly, means of contact, etc.

The concentrated use of forces or the so-called "assembly of small units to form a large group" is usually adopted to exterminate the enemy when they are on the move. Sometimes, this method is adopted to annihilate enemies who are on the defensive or who have on the halt. The concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration. We may employ a concentrated force in one important direction, while dispatching a part of the forces in another direction to carry out diversionary action against the enemy or to participate in popular movement.

Generally speaking, active dispersion and concentration of forces are regarded as main tactics employed in guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, it is essential that due emphasis be given to shifting the position of the troops. When the enemy feels that there is danger of attack from the guerrillas, it may be expected that forces will be sent to suppress or attack us. Consequently, guerrillas must consider such possibilities

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and fight on the spot if they can, or otherwise swiftly shift to some other areas without loss of any time. In launching attacks against the enemy by small groups, guerrillas can often shift their positions to attack some other enemy rather than trying to annihilate an enemy force in one place. It is also necessary for the guerrillas to shift from an area and proceed to another if the situation is not favorable. In critical moments, guerrillas should not remain in one place. They must shift swiftly from one place to another like running stream or strong wind. Troop movements should be carried out swiftly and secretly. Skillful diversionary tactics should be always employed to deceive, mislead, and to confuse the enemy, such as, "feign an attack from the east when the main attack is to be made from the west", "shift the troops from the south and then to the north to confuse the enemy", "fight a while and then withdraw immediately", and "launch the north to confuse the enemy", "fight a while and then withdraw immediately", and "launch attacks during night", etc.

Aggressive dispersion, concentration and shift are concrete expression of guerrilla initiative. Immobility and stagnation will force us to remain in a passive position and will lead to unnecessary losses. Intelligent leaders must not only know the importance of how to employ forces actively, but also how to execute the dispersion, concentration and shift of forces properly in accordance with the situations. Accurate estimation of situations and selection of proper opportunity for launching attacks require utmost skill. Only those who study the situation with an open mind, and who diligently investigate and study the situation thoroughly will attain this standard. It is necessary to consider the situation carefully in order to effectively carry out a successful operation.

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Finally, we come to the problem of planning. To win guerrilla warfare, it is necessary to make plans. Act as recklessly as foolhardy in guerrilla warfare. Foolhardy action indicates the ignorance of guerrilla warfare principles. Whether an action is to be taken by an entire guerrilla force, a single unit or guerrilla regiment, an accurate plan should always be made. Detailed plans should be made before any action is taken. The understanding of the situation, the definite assignment of duties, the distribution of forces, the enforcement of military-political education, the preparation of supplies and equipment, mobilization of the people, etc. must be carefully taken into consideration. Without such a plan, no initiative, no aggressiveness, or offensive can be achieved. It is much easier to make plans for regular warfare than guerrilla warfare. In guerrilla warfare, it would be a mistake to adopt a very rigid plan. Nevertheless, it is necessary to adopt some logical plan in accordance with the situation. It must be realized that the struggle against the enemy is not just a past time.

In summarizing the above, the first strategic principle of guerrilla warfare is to gain the initiative, to launch an aggressive war with careful planning, to fight an offensive battle in the defensive war, to engage in a swift decisive battle in the protracted war, and to launch periphery operations while fighting the main operations. This is the basic fundamental principle in guerrilla warfare. Once these problems are solved, victory in guerrilla warfare will be promised.

We have explained many things above. Everything, however, is centered on launching offensive campaigns and battles. The initiative can be obtained only after offensive victory. Every offensive battle

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should be organized and undertaken aggressively instead of passively. The active use of forces is best for offensive purposes. Planning should also be aimed to gain offensive victory. The tactical defensive battle will be meaningless without emphasis on supporting direct or indirect offensive. Swift and decisive combat results in saving time, and periphery operations can lay the ground work for offensive operations. Offensive moreover, is the only means to annihilate the enemy and to preserve oneself. Simple defensive action and retreat can be employed temporarily for the preservation of oneself, but is definitely inadequate for the annihilation of the enemy.

The above principle is basically applicable to both regular and guerrilla warfare. There is only a slight difference in degree regarding its application. It is necessary and important, however, to be acquainted on this point of differences in the carrying out of guerrilla warfare. We will not be able to win guerrilla warfare if the differences between the two methods are confused.

6. The second problem: To coordinate operations with regular warfare.

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is how to coordinate operations with regular warfare. The very nature of guerrilla warfare operations clearly shows the necessary relations between the two. It is important to recognize this relation in order to defeat the enemy decisively.

There are three ways in coordinating guerrilla warfare with regular warfare, namely, in strategy, campaign, and battle.

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Operations carried out by the guerrillas behind the enemy lines, such as to weaken the enemy, to disrupt enemy communications, to avert the morale of the regular armies and people, etc., must be in complete coordination with regular warfare. As an example, in the execution of guerrilla warfare in Manchuria, the problem of coordination between the two was never considered before the anti-Japanese war. The significance and importance of coordination became quite apparent since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The killing of enemy soldiers by the guerrillas, causing the enemy to waste ammunition, tying up of enemy soldiers in Manchuria, etc., have delayed the enemy from expanding southward into China proper, and have given us opportunities to strengthen our forces. It is also quite apparent that these actions will help to demoralize the enemy and at the same time, will help to improve our own troops' morale. We can also recognize the contribution made by the guerrillas in coordinating their activities with the regular army in disrupting enemy's transport activities on the major railroads, such as the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow Railroad, Tientsin--P'u-kou, and Tu-tung--Feng-lin-tu, Shih--chia-chuang--T'ai-yuan and the Shanghai--Hangchow railroads. These guerrillas are now being employed to carry out strategic defense by the regular army since the enemy has concluded its strategic offensive and has turned to defend the occupied territories. These guerrilla forces can be called upon to cooperate with the regular army in pushing back the enemy to recover all lost territories once the regular army commences its strategic counter-offensive. We must not neglect the importance of strategic coordination functions of guerrilla warfare. Leaders of guerrillas and regular armies must be aware of this importance.

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Guerrilla forces can also be asked to cooperate in campaigns. As an example, in the Hsin-k'ou Campaign north of T'ai-yuan, the guerrillas were assigned the mission of destroying the Tat'ung--Feng-ling-tu Railroad, Ping-hsing-k'uan Highway, and the Yang-tang-k'ou Highway all located north and south of Yen-men-k'uan. The coordinating between the two forces in this campaign was great. After the occupation of Feng-ling-tu by the enemy, the guerrillas coordinated their functions more closely with the regular armies in the defensive campaign in the areas along the south shores of the Yellow River in Shansi and Honan provinces. As another example, when the enemy launched attack in the southern part of Shantung Province, all guerrilla forces in the five provinces of North China effectively coordinated with the regular forces in the campaigns fought there. To effectively carry out coordinated operations, all leaders of guerrilla bases behind the enemy lines and all leaders of temporary units dispatched for specific mission must, under the unified command of a commander of such war area, unite their strength to fulfill the mission. They must distribute their own forces, adopt various methods according to time and place, take positive actions against enemy's most critical points, etc., to weaken and harass the enemy, disturb enemy's transportation, and to improve the morale of the armies operating along the main front. If the various guerrilla districts or guerrilla units act independently and fail to coordinate their operations with the overall campaign strategy, the effectiveness of strategic coordination will be lost although they may be contributing some good to the over-all strategy. This point must carefully borne in mind by all leaders. In order to coordinate operations, it is absolutely necessary to establish wireless communication network between the relatively large

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guerrilla forces and the guerrilla regiments.

It is the responsibility of every guerrilla unit operating near a front line to coordinate its operations with the regular army. This, of course, is possible only for those guerrilla units which are operating near the regular army and for those which were organized temporarily by the regular army to carry out special missions. These guerrilla units must follow the instructions given by leaders of the regular army in the carrying out of the mission assigned them. Even without the instructions from the leaders of the regular army, guerrillas should perform above functions through their own initiative. No matter where they are, guerrillas should never become idle spectators, but be on the alert to launch attacks against the enemy.

7. The third problem: How to establish bases?

Third problem of strategy in the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of bases. The long range aspect of the war made this problem necessary and important. The campaign to recover lost territories by the guerrillas should be undertaken only when the whole nation is ready to launch strategic overall counter offensive. Before counter-attack can be launched, the front line of the enemy would have penetrated deeply into and run across the central part of our country and more or less half of our territories would be controlled by the enemy and thus these territories will become the rear of the enemy. It is in these occupied territories where guerrilla warfare should be put into action. The rear of the enemy would become the front of the guerrillas and enemy would thus be forced to engage in a battle throughout its entire occupied territory. As long as our strategic counteroffensive is still pending,

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and as long as we are still unable to launch attacks to recover our lost territories, the scope of guerrilla warfare should be limited to fighting behind the enemy lines. Nobody can predict how long this war would take but it can be assumed that it will be for a long period. It may be assumed, moreover, that the enemy would intensify its counter-measures against the guerrillas to secure its hold in the occupied territories. After the termination of the enemy's strategic offensive, it may be assumed that she will greatly intensify her guerrilla suppression activities. As a result of this and because on the long range aspect of the war, it would be extremely difficult to sustain guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy without bases.

What is a guerrilla warfare base? It is a strategic base from which guerrilla warfare is to be carried out to fulfill strategic missions, to conserve and develop our strength, and to wipe out the enemy. Without a strategic base, every strategic mission and combat mission would be quite difficult to carry out. Guerrilla warfare is usually carried out in the rear of the enemy. Guerrilla warfare cannot survive and cannot be developed for very long without a base. The base itself is usually the rear base of guerrilla warfare.

There have been many peasant struggles in the past but the operations were no more than banditry. None of them succeeded. With the progress made in communications and technology, it would be a folly to try to gain victory by using the old methods of banditry. Such methods are popular among bankrupted peasants and similar thinking is carried by some guerrilla leaders who are overlooking the importance of guerrilla bases. Consequently, it is of utmost importance that they discard this line of thinking. Only after we give up the bandits' way of thinking

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and adopt a definite policy for establishing bases can we hope to gain victory through guerrilla warfare.

After explaining the "necessity and importance of the base", the following problems must be solved: Kinds of bases, guerrilla districts and bases, conditions in establishing bases, strengthening and developing bases, encirclement by the enemy and by us.

(1) Kinds of bases.

There are three kinds of bases to be established in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war: mountains, plains, and rivers, lakes and ports.

It is clear to everybody that the establishment of bases in a mountain area is advantageous. Those bases which have been established, are being established, or to be established are as follows: Ch'ang-pai Shan, Ku-t'ai Shan, T'ai-hang Shan, T'ai Shan, Yeh Shan and Mao Shan. These bases will be an important battle grounds where guerrilla warfare can be carried out for a long period. All mountainous areas at the rear of the enemy should be developed into guerrilla area. Guerrilla bases should be established in such areas when necessary.

Plains are not as suitable a site for bases as compared to the mountains. However, it is not impossible either to develop guerrilla warfare or to establish bases in these areas. Large scale guerrilla warfare was developed in Hopei plains in the plains of northeastern and northwestern Shantung Province. It has been proven that guerrilla warfare can be developed in the plains. No conclusive proof has been secured to date to see if it is possible to maintain bases in

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the plains for a long period. However, the establishment of temporary bases, bases for small units, and seasonal bases has proven very fruitful. Because, on the one hand, the enemy lacks sufficient forces to be deployed throughout China and is now enforcing barbarous policy, and because on the other hand, China is such a large country made of such large population, the guerrillas are in a very advantageous position to develop guerrilla warfare in the plains and to establish temporary bases. Properly guided, the establishment of mobile bases for small units for prolonged periods would also be possible. There is no doubt that once the enemy completes her offensive and begins focusing her attention on the consolidation of occupied territories, she would intensify her anti-guerrilla activities. Guerrillas operating in the plains would be the first to be attacked. In such case, large guerrilla troops active in the plains would not be able to continue their operations in the plains for long, but will have to gradually shift their positions into the mountain areas. Since the present war is a struggle against foreign aggression it is possible for us to disperse many small guerrilla units through the vast plains to carry out mobile operations by shifting bases swiftly and frequently. It is just as easy to carry out guerrilla warfare in the summer as well as in the winter. Since the enemy is in no position to expand her military power, policies should be adopted to develop and expand guerrilla warfare in the plains by establishing temporary bases and to extend the guerrilla warfare of small units, including those of seasonal nature, by establishing permanent bases.

Generally speaking, it is easier to develop guerrilla warfare and

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establish bases near rivers, lakes, and ports in plains. In the past, "pirates" and "water gangs" were very successfully in these places. During the Red Army period, the Hung-hu guerrilla warfare persisted for many years. They are many proofs that guerrilla warfare can be developed and bases can be established much easier along the rivers, lakes, ports and streams. Nevertheless, few anti-Japanese groups and anti-Japanese masses are paying much attention to this today. The situation has not presented itself as yet, but undoubtedly, attention would soon be given to this importance. As an example, it may be expected that guerrilla warfare would be soon be extended to Hung-tse Hu area in North Kiangsi, T'ai Hu area in South Kiangsi, and all enemy occupied ports and streams along the rivers and seashores. In addition, permanent bases would be established in the vicinity of all rivers, lakes, ports, and streams. Such a policy would constitute an important part of the nationwide guerrilla development program. Without such a policy, the enemy can utilize water transportation. However, this has not been done to date and still remains one of the flaws of our overall strategic plan. Measures must be taken to correct this situation.

(2) Guerrilla districts and bases.

From the standpoint of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, distinction is made between guerrilla districts and bases. Those districts where the surrounding areas are occupied by the enemy but not the middle or those districts which were once occupied by the enemy but which have been vacated, such as hsien district in Wu-t'ai Shan,

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establish bases near rivers, lakes, and ports in plains. In the past, "pirates" and "water tanks" were very successfully in these places. During the Red Army period, the Hung-hu guerrilla warfare persisted for many years. They are many proofs that guerrilla warfare can be developed and bases can be established much easier along the rivers, lakes, ports and streams. Nevertheless, few anti-Japanese groups and anti-Japanese masses are paying much attention to this today. The situation has not presented itself as yet, but undoubtedly, attention would soon be given to this importance. As an example, it may be expected that guerrilla warfare would be soon be extended to Hung-tse Hu area in North Kiangsi, Tai Hu area in South Kiangsi, and all enemy occupied ports and streams along the rivers and seashores. In addition, permanent bases would be established in the vicinity of all rivers, lakes, ports, and streams. Such a policy would constitute an important part of the nationwide guerrilla development program. Without such a policy, the enemy can utilize water transportation. However, this has not been done to date and still remains one of the flaws of our overall strategic plan. Measures must be taken to correct this situation.

(2) Guerrilla districts and bases.

From the standpoint of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, distinction is made between guerrilla districts and bases. Those districts where the surrounding areas are occupied by the enemy but not the middle or those districts which were once occupied by the enemy but which have been vacated, such as hsien district in Wu-t'ai Shan,

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T'ai-hang Shan, and T'ai Shan are regarded as bases. They can be conveniently used as bases to develop guerrilla warfare. But there are districts different from those mentioned above, such as the districts in the eastern and northern part of the Wu-t'ai Shan district, the districts located in the western part of Hopei and the southern part of Chehar, and the districts in the eastern part of Pao-ting and west of Chian-shou, etc. Guerrillas in these districts could not completely occupy these districts and as a result, were forced to carry out only hit-and-run tactics. In some places, guerrilla units were made up mainly of regular army personnel. When these forces withdrew, the area was occupied by puppet troops. Thus, these districts could not be considered as guerrilla bases and were referred as guerrilla districts. Only after all enemy troops and officials within a guerrilla district were annihilated or subdued, all puppets destroyed, etc., then the district was reclassified as a guerrilla base.

In some places, the whole guerrilla warfare is conducted on a district basis from the very beginning to the end. As an example, in east Hopei, the puppet government was established long ago, and thus the people's army in the area and the guerrilla sub-unit dispatched from Wu-t'ai Shan were forced to limit their activities to a guerrilla district area. Initially, these guerrilla units could only select a certain area in the district as a temporary rear base, frequently referred to as, a temporary base. The status of a guerrilla district can be changed only after the enemy is defeated and the people are completely mobilized. We can see that the transformation of a guerrilla district into a base is a very difficult process.

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Many districts remain as a guerrilla district for a long time. A state of stagnation may develop in some areas where both the enemy and our forces attempt to establish a stable government without success. It has happened in the districts along the enemy-occupied railroads or near the cities.

In big cities, railroad stations, and in the plains which are controlled by strong enemy forces, guerrillas are able only to approach the vicinities. They are unable to operate within the area.

The above stated situation could be reversed, that is, bases may degenerate into guerrilla districts, and guerrilla districts may degenerate into enemy's strong hold. These reversals are generally brought about by weaknesses in our command or by heavy pressure put on by the enemy. Guerrilla leaders should be aware of such possibilities.

Consequently, the whole enemy occupied territories may be divided into three categories. The first refer to those areas held by the guerrillas and their governments. The second are those areas occupied and controlled by the Japanese imperialists and the puppet governments. The third are guerrilla districts or buffer zones where both sides are fighting to get hold of. The duty of guerrilla leaders is to enlarge the first and the third areas and to limit the second. This is the strategic mission of guerrilla warfare.

### (3) Conditions for establishing bases

The basic requirement for the establishment of bases is its usefulness to the armed force in the maneuvering of the troops to defeat the enemy and to mobilize the people. Therefore, the problem in the establishment of bases is primarily a problem concerning the armed force.

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Guerrilla leaders should first establish one or more guerrilla units and try to develop them into guerrilla columns or regular units. The organizations of armed force is the main fundamental factor in the establishment of bases. Without troops, or troops without power, nothing can be done. This is the first requirement.

The second requirement which is inseparable from the first is the maneuvering of troops to defeat the enemy through the cooperation of the people. Place that is controlled by the enemy is the base of the enemy and should not be the base for guerrillas. It is quite evident that enemy bases cannot be converted into guerrilla bases without first defeating the enemy. Rumor of pending enemy attack must be given serious consideration even if it seems untrue.

Similarly, the third requirement is inseparable from the above. It is the mobilization of the people to carry out anti-Japanese resistance war. It requires the organization of the people including workers, farmers, youths, women, children, merchants, etc. They must be organized into various organizations, which must be gradually developed in accordance with the degree of their political awakening and their willingness to participate in the struggle. The strength of anti-Japanese movement cannot be best used unless the people are organized. Even the liquidation of the collaborators and traitors in the course of the struggle requires the full support of the people. Through the support of the people, we will be able to strengthen or establish our own governments in enemy occupied areas. If a former Chinese government is still functioning in an area despite efforts by the enemy to abolish it, support must be

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given to strengthen it. If not, every effort must be made to reestablish it through popular support. Such government would be invaluable in carrying out the policy of the anti-Japanese united front, and in uniting all forces against our enemy, the Japanese imperialists.

Effective guerrilla bases can be established only after the above three basic requirements are met.

The geographical and economic conditions must also be given considerations in the establishment of a base. With regard to geographical conditions, mention has been made previously of the three different situations in the past dealing with "kinds of bases". Thus, it is sufficient only to add that the vastness of an area must be considered. Since mountain areas are generally encircled from three or four directions, they are the best place for the establishment of bases to carry out long range resistance. However, in the selection of a site in the mountains, due consideration must be given to terrain features so that it could not hamper any guerrilla movements. Even in the plains, guerrilla warfare is limited. This is also true for rivers, lakes, and ports. The guerrilla warfare in China can be developed widely because of favorable conditions. The vast territories of China, on the one hand, and the enemy's lack of armed forces, on the other, are factors which greatly favor the expansion of guerrilla activities. It is almost impossible to develop guerrilla warfare in a small nation like Belgium.

From the physical standpoint economic requirement is similar to that of geographical requirement. We are primarily concerned on how to establish bases at the rear of the enemy. Any place where the enemy extends her hands, there are Chinese; consequently, there are

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means of maintaining a livelihood. There should be no problem in choosing economic qualifications in establishing bases. Regardless of economic requirements, every place where there are Chinese, guerrilla warfare can be developed and permanent or temporary bases can be established. But once we focus our attention to political field, the problems become greatly magnified. The problem of economic requirements is closely tied with the political picture of an area. In the solving of economic problem in the establishment of guerrilla bases, the principle of anti-Japanese united front, the principle of reasonable distribution of burdens and the protection of commerce must be considered. Local governments and guerrillas must not neglect this phase. Otherwise it will greatly affect the establishment of bases and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare. The term reasonable distribution burdens means that "those who have money contribute money". Of course, peasants must also donate a limited amount of food to guerrillas. Guerrillas should maintain strict discipline in the protection of commerce. No single commercial establishment should be confiscated except those belonging to traitors who have been convicted. This is a difficult task but must be carried out.

(h) Strengthening and developing bases

In order to encircle the enemy in big cities and main communication routes, guerrillas must expand their bases with utmost efforts, so as to approach every enemy's base to harass and demoralize their troops. This means that guerrilla bases should be developed

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simultaneously. We must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. No matter whether this conservatism is from idleness, indulgence or from overestimation of the enemy strength, it will greatly hamper the efficient operations of war as a whole and will endanger guerrilla warfare and bases. We must not forget to stabilize our bases. The main task is to mobilize and organize the people. The training of guerrilla troops and local armed forces is also an important task. This is necessary for the maintenance of drawn out war. Without stabilization, there can be no vigorous advances. Any advance without strong bases endanger the very existence of such base. The correct principle is to "strengthen and advance steadily". This would also make it possible to carry out the principle of "advance and launch offense and withdraw and strengthen defense". In a prolonged struggle the problem for every guerrilla unit. How this is to be carried out depends on the situation. In one period, stress may be placed on expansion, that is enlargement of guerrilla district and increasing guerrilla strength. In another period, emphasis may be given to stabilization, that is organizing the people and training the troops. Due to the fact that these two are of different nature, military maneuvers and actual work become different. The relative importance of these two factors must be determined by time element and actual circumstances.

(5) Several kinds of encirclements by the enemy and by us.

Viewing the entire anti-Japanese war, it can be seen that the enemy is employing a strategic encirclement tactics against our country.

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The enemy is now engaged in a strategic offensive and outer perimeter operations, while we are fighting a strategic defensive and limited operations. This is the first encirclement tactics against us by the enemy. Since we are superior in number however, we are in a position to adopt an offensive policy in the campaigns and battles to be launched against the enemy who is advancing toward us from many directions. This offensive will enable us to encircle every separately advancing enemy. This is the first encirclement tactics to be used against the enemy. A study of guerrilla bases behind the enemy lines shows that every isolated base has been placed under enemy's encirclement tactics. For instance, all bases in the Ku-tai Shan District, and the Northwestern part of Shansi Province have been placed under enemy's pressure. This is the second enemy envelopment strategy against us. However, by studying all guerrilla bases which have been established in line with the entire front of our regular armies, it may be seen that we are encircling many enemies. For example, when we encircled the Tai-tung--Feng-ling-tu Railroad in Shansi from three directions, Tai-yuan from four directions and many areas in Hopei and Shantung Provinces we actually encircled all enemy forces caught in-between these areas. This is the second encirclement tactics we can employ against the enemy. Thus we have two kinds of encirclement, one against the other. By the above, it may be easily seen how important it is to establish bases behind the enemy in guerrilla warfare. In our present, anti-Japanese warfare, all leading military authorities and guerrilla leaders of various areas must develop guerrilla warfare behind the enemy and establish bases wherever possible. If we could establish an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific through diplomatic negotiations with other countries, such as Soviet

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Union, etc., then it would be possible to encircle Japan by a larger outer line. Although there seems no possibility of realizing this immediately, there is every possibility in the future. The world is changing. The Japanese people are just preparing for a great war.

c. The fourth problem: defensive strategy and offensive strategy of guerrilla warfare.

The fourth strategic problem of guerrilla warfare is the problems of offensive and defensive strategy. The problem is how to apply concretely the offensive combat plans that were discussed in the first problem in either offensive or defensive operations of guerrilla warfare.

However, small, actual defensive and offensive (more accurately strategic counter-offensive) strategy of the whole country is being implemented at each guerrilla base or its vicinity whenever the enemy is engaged in a combat. When the enemy is on the offensive and we are in a defensive position, we are carrying out the former strategy and when the enemy is on the defensive the latter strategy can be employed.

#### (a) Strategy -- Defensive in Guerrilla Warfare

Once guerrilla warfare is launched and expanded, it may be assumed that the enemy will immediately launch guerrilla suppression campaigns to wipe out our guerrilla bases. It may be expected, moreover, that these campaigns will be intensified after the enemy halts its strategic offensive and focus her attention on the consolidation of occupied territories. It is imperative that all guerrilla leaders recognize this possibility or they will be caught and defeated by the enemy as a result of unpreparedness.

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In the operations to check and wipe out guerrilla activities and bases, the enemy usually employs encirclement tactics. As an example, in the operations launched by the enemy at Wu-t'ai Shan, four or five "suppression" campaigns were launched. Each time the enemy deployed her force into three, four, or as high as six to seven groups to encircle our forces from all directions. The degree of guerrilla warfare development in an area determines the importance of a guerrilla base. The intensity of enemy's guerrilla suppression campaign, moreover, will be governed largely by the importance of the area to the enemy. It may be assumed, therefore, that anti-guerrilla actions in important communications areas, etc., will be much more severe than in non-strategic areas. The effectiveness of guerrilla operations in an area can often be measured by the number of guerrilla suppression campaigns launched in such area by the enemy.

When encircled by the enemy, the best strategy is to adopt a counter-encirclement formation to break through the line. It is comparatively very easy to break through an encirclement formed by enemy advancing by several routes in small groups or columns. In such cases, the enemy very seldom has a rear guard unit. In carrying out encirclement tactics, the enemy must leave their own area and fight in areas controlled mainly by our forces; therefore, they are usually at a disadvantage. Enemy forces sent out on such mission should be bogged down by our auxiliary forces along their routes of advance, while our main force should strike and annihilate isolated groups. By the employment of this tactics, enemy superiority in number and weapons can be neutralized and we would be able to strike a fatal blow against them. Retreating enemy must be pursued. Enemy seeking refuge in small towns or villages must be attacked

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and annihilated before reinforcements arrive. In such way, enemy's attempt to encircle our troops can be broken.

Within large base like Ku-tai Shan District, there are five military subdistricts under one military district. An independent armed force is stationed at each military sub-district. During an operation in the above district, these forces coordinated their activities and were successful in routing a large enemy force sent out to encircle this area.

In planning a counter-encirclement operation, the main force is generally used to operate inside the main line and all auxiliary forces are assigned missions in adjacent areas such as to destroy the enemy's communications, stop enemy's reinforcements, etc. If the enemy remains in our base area and shows no sign of withdrawing, a portion of our forces can be left at the base to carry out disturbance actions while the main force can be used to attack the base areas where the enemy came from. This strategy will force the enemy to evacuate our base area.

In launching counter-encirclement operations, local people's anti-Japanese self-defense army and all people's organization should be mobilized to participate in the war. It is of utmost importance to enforce martial laws and to carry out "scorched earth" policy in the various areas to resist the enemy. The former means to suppress all traitors, lest the enemy get valuable information, the latter is to deprive the enemy of foods.

When retreating the enemy usually burns and destroys all houses, buildings, etc., along the retreating roads, so as to prevent our forces <sup>from</sup> occupying them. The enemy fails to realize, however, that by such actions, they are depriving themselves of these buildings and foods

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when they are able to regain the area. He is actually hurting himself.

Unless it can be definitely proven that there is no way to break through an encirclement the leaders of the guerrilla units must not abandon any base. Possession should be prevented. Encirclement could be broken. Bases in the mountainous areas are comparatively secure from encirclement. In the plains where there is a greater danger from encirclement, a guerrilla force should be divided into a number of small units to engage in small operations. All large guerrilla units must be temporarily evacuated into the mountains until the main enemy force moves to some other place.

Because China is such a large country and because the enemy is facing a manpower shortage to cope with the situation, she is still faced with the problems of how to control it. It is possible, however, that she may divert to the China civil war doctrine of fortification, especially in the areas where she is threatened. Even in such case, we must not abandon our guerrilla warfare policy. The very fact that guerrilla warfare has proven very successful during the civil war period should give us greater incentive to explore and develop it for use in the present war. The enemy may employ, not only better qualified forces, but greater number. But the inherent contradiction between the enemy and us can never be solved. The weak point of the enemy command can never be corrected. Therefore, our victory will depend on gaining popular support, and adoption of more aggressive operations.

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## (c) Offensive strategy of guerrilla warfare

When the enemy offensive is stopped, we will be able to implement our offensive strategy and then the enemy will be on the defensive.

Our operational strategy is therefore not to attack strong enemy or enemy in the stronghold, but strike and wipe out small enemy's or traitor's forces which are vulnerable. In such way, we will be able to expand our control, mobilize the people for the anti-Japanese struggle, supplement and train the troops and organize new guerrilla units. If all these were successfully carried out and even if the enemy are still fighting a defensive war we would be able to expand our control into new areas and launch attacks against cities and communication lines vital to the enemy. All of these are important factors in offensive strategy. The main purpose is to expand our military forces, gain the support of the people, effectively dissipate enemy force and to prepare for decisive counter offensive.

It is necessary that the troops be given training and rest. When the enemy has been pushed back into defensive position, troops should be given rest and training. Even when operations are being launched to expand our areas of occupation, annihilate small enemy groups, and to mobilize the people, every effort must be made to give the troops some rest and training. Many times, difficult problems relating to food, clothing and equipment were amicably settled during an operational lull. It might be added that breaks between operations could be effectively utilized to destroy enemy communication lines, interrupt enemy's transportation and assist the operations of the regular armies.

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Lull between operations can be employed by the guerrilla bases, guerrilla districts and guerrilla troops to repair damages done by the enemy. People within the enemy occupied areas, upon learning such benevolent doings of the guerrillas, would become pro-guerrillas. It must be remembered, however, that increasing pro-guerrilla sentiments among the people in enemy occupied area will arouse the hatred of the enemy and may lead to increasing anti-guerrilla campaigns. Therefore, guerrilla leaders must not become complacent over their offensive success to under-estimate the enemy. It is necessary to maintain close watch of every enemy movement at all times.

2. The fifth problem: Development of mobile warfare

The fifth strategic problem in guerrilla warfare is the development of mobile warfare. This is necessary and possible because the war is cruel and may last for a long period. If China can defeat the Japanese and can rapidly recover lost territories war can be ended and there would be no need to develop guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. In the course of such a war, guerrillas will be given necessary training and will be gradually incorporated into the regular army. Gradually the operations of the guerrilla units will follow more along the line of a regular force, and guerrilla warfare would become mobile warfare. Guerrilla leaders must recognize this possibility. Only by recognizing this will they be able to adhere to the policy of developing mobile warfare and carry it out effectively.

Guerrilla warfare, of today was developed to a large degree by detachments organized from the regular armies. Generally speaking the nature of the operations is guerrilla warfare but they contained

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elements of mobile warfare. Mobile warfare will gradually become more important as the war progresses. Guerrilla warfare will not only be developed rapidly, but also be improved. The tactics now being employed are far more superior than those employed in Manchuria. To incorporate the guerrilla force into a regular army, two conditions are required:

- 1) increase in the strength of guerrilla forces and improvement in quality. With regard to strength, the people could be mobilized into the force, or local small units can be assembled to be incorporated into the guerrilla force. With respect to quality, training during the course of war can be carried out.

In assembling small units, localism must be avoided because in military matters, there is no place for localism. Simple militarism must also be avoided.

Localism pays attention only to the local interests and disregards matters of national interests. Leaders of guerrilla columns or main force should take notice of this factor and adopt policy to gradually and partially assemble these local units to carry out guerrilla warfare. They should also adopt methods along volunteer line to assemble these units without changing the system or replacing the cadres, thus enabling small groups to be harmoniously absorbed into the larger group.

The simple militarism, contrary to the localism, results from an erroneous attitude on the part of the leaders of the regular army who try to extend their power without regard to people welfare. They are under the impression that the development from guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare mean the abolition of guerrilla warfare. On the contrary, the gradual formation of a main force, capable of engaging

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in mobile warfare, comes from the expanding guerrilla warfare. The main force must always be supported by numerous guerrilla units.

The latter is a powerful element of the main force and at the same time is a reliable source for the continuous expansion of the main force. Therefore, leaders of the main force who adhere to simple militarism and fail to take account of local people and governments, should correct themselves so that the expansion of the regular army and the growth of local armed forces can be properly effected.

In order to improve quality, we must improve our political affairs, organizations, equipment, techniques, tactics and discipline, and minimize the guerrillas' ways and habits by the standards of the regular army. Politically speaking, leaders and combatants should realize the necessity of elevating guerrilla columns to regular armies, encourage all to make an effort for this purpose, and guarantee it through political work. From the standpoint of organization, a system of military and political activities agencies, activities personnel, working methods and the supply and sanitation agencies, etc., should be gradually established in accordance with the structure of a regular army group. So far as equipment is concerned, quality and kinds of weapons, and communications materials must be increased. Required techniques and tactics of guerrilla forces must be elevated to meet the standard of a regular army. Discipline should be improved to the extent that orders or restrictions are effectively carried out.

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It takes long process and great effort to accomplish all these things. These cannot be effected in one morning or one evening, but we should aim in that direction. Only by doing so, a main armed forces operating at a guerrilla base could be created and a mobile warfare could be effectively carried out. This could be accomplished rather smoothly if there are detachments or cadres dispatched by regulars. Therefore, regular armies have the responsibility to help out guerrilla units.

#### 10. The sixth problem: Relations of command

The last problem of the strategy in the anti-Japanese war is the problem of command relations. The solution to this problem is indispensable for the smooth development of guerrilla warfare. Being different from the command system of regular warfare, the methods of commanding guerrilla warfare are inconsistent with the principle of centralization, because guerrilla units are a low-level armed organizations and are more competent when dispersed. If we try to apply the regular army methods to guerrilla warfare, the highly active and mobile nature of guerrilla warfare will be lost or restricted. Therefore, highly centralized command is not suitable in guerrilla warfare. To use a highly concentrated system of command to highly active guerrilla warfare is thus out of the question.

Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that there should be no centralized command in guerrilla warfare. Since large-scale guerrilla warfare can be launched simultaneously with large-scale regular warfare, it is necessary to coordinate these two movements properly. Thus, there is need for a unified command to effect coordination.

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This means a unified command under the national chief of staff and commanders of war zones on strategic operations. In a guerrilla district or a guerrilla base there are many guerrilla units. It consists of one or several guerrilla regiments (sometimes there are regular troops serving) as the main force and many large and small guerrilla columns as auxiliaries. There are also numerous armed people who are primarily concerned with productive activities. The enemy there also forms a united front with respect to that area to deal with guerrillas. Thus, the problem of the unified command arises.

We are opposed to the principle of absolute centralization on the one hand and the absolute dispersal on the other. The correct answer is a concentrated command in matters pertaining to strategy but divided command with regard to various campaigns and battles.

Concentrated command in general strategy, includes disposition of the guerrilla units throughout the entire country, coordinating operations of guerrilla and regular warfare in various war areas, and the unified guidance of all anti-Japanese armed forces within each case or battle post. We must try hard to harmonize, unify, and concentrate as the actual condition requires. In general matters: that is, things of strategic nature, the lower level should report to the higher level and accept the guidance of the latter so as to get the benefit of coordinated actions. But there is a limit of centralization. If we get across the limitation and interfere with concrete matters of the lower level, like detailed maneuvering in campaigns and battles, it will be equally harmful, because these detailed matters should be done according

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to the situations which are beyond the knowledge of the higher authorities in remote places. This is the principle of divided command in campaigns and battles. This principle also applies to operations in regular warfare, especially when communication equipment is inadequate. In a word, it is and "independent and autonomous guerrilla warfare under a unified strategy."

Since guerrilla base is organized as a military region with sub-regions, Hsien, and local districts, the armed units should attach themselves to these governments in accordance with their functions. The command relation, as mentioned above, should be such that the general strategy is to be handled by the higher levels while detailed matters are to be entrusted to lower levels. Regarding detailed matters, the latter have complete authority (the authority of self-determination and self-execution).

If the higher level wants to express its opinion on concrete matters it may deliver it in the form of "instruction" but never "order", which means that it cannot be changed. The larger the area is, the more complicated the situation will be. Since the distance there between the higher and the lower levels is so far away that more independent and autonomous authority over detailed matters should be extended. As more and more authority is given to local level in conformity with its interest, the ability of local officers in coping with complicated situations and in accomplishing victorious guerrilla warfare will develop. When the columns or corps is engaged in a coordinated action, then the principle of concentrated command should be applied among themselves since the situation can be seen more easily; they are in disperse actions, then the principle of "concentrate in general and disperse in detail" should be applied because the detailed situations are not clear.

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If orders are issued by a superior to assemble, they must be carried out. Insubordination is not permitted under a military system.

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